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Abstract
Environmental questions call for a radical revision and re-evaluation 
of our ways of thinking, valuing and acting. Ecological wisdom as a 
holistic view to these questions is therefore an increasingly important 
challenge for education and its basic philosophical presuppositions. My 
article asks, what are the options of pedagogy in this situation? To my 
mind, classical theories of Bildung, of the cultivation and formation of 
man, have an important theoretical potentiality for environmentally 
wise education. I take as an example G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of Bildung 
as an antagonistic, dialectical process. Dialectical environmental 
wisdom sees humans both identical to and different from nature. We 
must control nature to a certain degree, but all the time learn from its 
feedback. Possible harmony with nature would therefore develop in an 
open, dialogical and dialectical learning process.
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Environmental problems are not always small, technically or institutionally 
solvable practical questions. First, they are serious, ‘wicked’ problems: often 
extremely complex issues with contingent factors and therefore difficult to control 
both technically and socially. Secondly, they are theoretically and philosophically 
deep problems, which puts many paradigmatic assumptions of our traditional 
scientific and philosophical thinking and basic cultural ideals and values into 
question. Environmental questions therefore call for a radical revision and re-
evaluation of our ways of thinking, valuing and acting. 
In this situation, what are the implications for general pedagogy? Pedagogy 
must always reflect the probable future challenges our children will face and try 
to develop such practices, mentalities and value standpoints that could anticipate 
future challenges and their possible solutions. In our time, environmental 
questions must therefore have a more important role in forming pedagogical 
practices than they currently have. There are many uncertain factors involved, so 
we must keep different options open in order to manage our relationship with 
the environment. In this case, pedagogy does not have one solid fundament to 
build on and must therefore take many possibilities into account. A dialogical 
approach and cross-disciplinary questioning must therefore be an integral part of 
environmental education.
An environmentally conscious philosophy of education is an extremely 
important field in this new situation. It can inform practical pedagogy with the 
new problems about environmental thinking. New environmental consciousness 
is still developing, and there is no philosophical, value-theoretical and ethical 
or scientific-technological and political consensus about the seriousness of and 
solutions for the situation. Alternatively, it is necessary to strive for a rational 
consensus. The danger of relativism is serious because it supports environmental 
denialism: in philosophy, we must also take critical realistic alternatives seriously 
and seek for a metaphysical and ontological fundament for environmental ethics 
and politics which could guarantee the wellbeing of both man and nature. The 
subjective constructivism and narrativism of the late 20th century are not fruitful 
theoretical options here. They only support anthropocentric, narrow culturalist 
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thinking and do not help to bridge the traditional methodological dualism 
between the humanities and the natural sciences.
What are the options for traditional pedagogy in this situation? To my 
mind, classical theories of Bildung, of the cultivation and formation1 of man, 
have an important theoretical potentiality for our search for a theoretical basis 
to environmentally wise education. Bildung referred originally – until Kant – to 
the natural growth of organisms. Alternatively, its cultural aspect, the Bildung of 
culture, has cultura in its Latin origins, which also has a meaning related to the 
cultivation of the natural environment.2 Of course, this aspect can be interpreted 
in an anthropocentric way only. But especially in German Romanticism the 
pantheistic conception of nature saw human culture in a positive interaction with 
nature, and especially with wild nature, through which we can learn about higher 
spiritual and aesthetic values. For example, the sublimity of nature (Kant) can 
deepen not only our aesthetical views of nature but also affect our basic ethical 
and philosophical views concerning nature. The young Kant formulated a view 
of man who basically cannot control mighty nature and is explicitly denied the 
physicotheological view of man and nature, which was still typical during the 
early Enlightenment. (Väyrynen, 2006, pp. 225–228; 2008).
In my mind, the concept of Bildung found its most interesting formulation 
in G.W.F. Hegel’s thinking. He stressed the antagonistic character of Bildung. 
Human development is not a process of harmonic growth but has necessary 
moments of reification and alienation.3 These moments are not negative aspects of 
external power but rather positive challenges for the learning process (Väyrynen, 
2012). This fits very well with our relationship with the environment: we are both 
identical to and different from nature. We must control it to a certain degree but 
all the time learn from its feedback. We must seek harmony with it, but this is 
possible only in a dialectical relationship with reified/alienated moments of 
1 Because there is no generally accepted direct translation in English, I use the German term.
2 And, in principle today, conditions for a sustainable man-nature relationship.
3 Reification means our necessary connections to thing-like (lat. re = thing) connections. 
This is necessary for the human condition: already the use of language and tools is reification. 
Alienation refers to such outer conditions (ideologies, politics, institutions), that prevent 
humans from fully realizing their human potentialities. Alienation is not so necessary as 
reifications: it can – at least in principle – being avoided in as much that human freedom and 
autonomy is increasing in a better functioning society.
Kari Väyrynen
198
the process. Our identity with nature is dialectical: partly harmonious, partly 
disharmonious.
An equally important aspect of the Hegelian concept of Bildung is the political. 
Education is bound to basic institutional structures of society. Family, civil society 
and state have their own educational goals. Hegel stresses the independence of 
education against inherited family traditions (such as different religions), which 
tend to be too conservative and traditionalistic. Alternatively, education must be 
independent of the short-term economic interests of a capitalistic economy in civil 
society. Educational institutions are therefore rather parts of the state insofar as 
the latter represents a reasonable general will of society towards a better future, 
towards ‘freedom of all’ as the ultimate goal of history, as Hegel understands it 
(Väyrynen, 2016). Whilst bearing our topic in mind, I would add that this means 
of course only positive freedom, through which we must become both socially and 
environmentally responsible citizens. Promoting the general interest, which is the 
fundament of pedagogy, today includes our interests in a good environment – and 
not only for us but also in itself. (An und für sich, as Hegel would say: that means 
in an environmental context that we should learn to promote our own interests 
[ für uns] in such a way that it does not harm the interests of nature [an sich], that 
is, the interests of all living species in a good life of their own.)
Traditions of wisdom: Limits and possibilities
Environmental philosophy has challenged many anthropocentric traces of 
traditional philosophy, especially in metaphysics and ethics. But the original 
ideal of philosophical knowledge as wisdom (Gr. sophia) has also been positively 
accepted as a background interest and synthesising activity in environmental 
philosophy and environmental knowledge in general. For example, the Norwegian 
founder of deep ecology, Arne Naess (1912–2009), spoke as early as in 1973 about 
ecosophy (Naess, 1973/1976). Another example is the Finnish philosopher Georg 
Henrik von Wright (1916–2003), who saw in the ancient idea of the avoidance of 
hybris a wise environmental principle in the 1980s (Väyrynen, 2017). The roots 
of Western thinking were actually not so anthropocentric, as many historians of 
environmental thinking have asserted. Even for Plato, whose dualism has been 
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almost unanimously been criticised as an anthropocentric position, the idea of 
cosmic harmony was normative for human action, which should not step outside 
its proper limits (Väyrynen, 2006).
Not only classical Greek philosophy but also original Chinese wisdom, which 
was expressed in the early yin/yang cosmology and ethics,4 tried to harmonise 
our relationship with nature. Especially in Taoism, yin and yang should be in a 
harmonic relationship (he), and this harmony was also considered a normative 
principle for man’s actions. Harmony (he) refers to the bringing of all different 
elements into proper proportion. If, for example, ‘there is yang without yin, there 
will be no life and peace will vanish’ (Wang, 2016, pp. 3–5). Wise human action, 
such as successful charioteering, is therefore based in adaptivity to the natural 
environment and forces, functional efficiency in coping with environmental 
disturbances and the reorganisation of inherited behaviour patterns to fit existing 
environmental situations. Yin/yang is a configuration of forces, ‘the rhythm 
of human life, earth’s changes, and heaven’s powers’, leading to Dao, to wise 
knowledge, or how to use power (Wang, 2016, p. 11). At this fundamental level, 
the traditions of the West and East share common ground. 
For environmental research, von Wright’s basic distinctions concerning 
traditional scientific rationality and environmentally sensitive wisdom are 
important. In his essays from the 1950s he saw the ancient concept of wisdom 
(sophia), and especially practical wisdom ( fronesis), as the main focus of his 
philosophical thinking. Later on, it was important to von Wright to distinguish 
between scientific-technological rationality and traditional wisdom, or the 
rational and the reasonable. In his article Images of science and forms of rationality 
(1985), he writes that 
rationality, when contrasted with reasonableness, has to do primarily with 
formal correctness of reasoning, efficiency of means to an end, the confirmation 
and testing of beliefs. It is goal-oriented … Judgments of reasonableness, again, 
are value-oriented. They are concerned with the right way of living, with what 
is thought good or bad for man. The reasonable is, of course, also rational – but 
the ‘merely rational’ is not always reasonable. 
4 Yin is a cosmic, active masculine principle of heaven, yang a passive feminine principle of 
the life-producing earth. In Confucianism, the masculine principle is dominant, in Thaoism, 
the feminine (Väyrynen, 2006, 49–65).
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The search for the reasonable was especially typical of the ancient Greeks. They 
were searching for the right natural order, ‘a eunomia, i.e. lawful and just order’. 
To understand the world order was ‘to attain wisdom rather than knowledge; it 
was, as has been said, to attune one’s life to its “natural” conditions’ (von Wright, 
1993, pp. 172–174).
For von Wright, the environmental implications of this distinction are 
already clear in his article (1985). He stresses the importance of human-ecological 
research. He sympathises with a new holistic worldview, which would represent ‘a 
new form of scientific rationality’. According to him, this would ‘encourage a shift 
in the view of the man-nature relationship from an idea of domination to one of 
co-evolution’. This could help ‘the adaptation of industrial society to the biological 
conditions of its survival’ (von Wright, 1993, p. 187). Later on, he developed these 
ideas further in many books and articles before his death in 2003.5 
All scientific research is based on human interests and values, such as Jürgen 
Habermas has shown in his famous theory of knowledge interests (Habermas, 
1968). In environmental research, the core values and interests are often explicitly 
recognised in order to protect nature (for example, biodiversity, ecosystem 
health). The environmental sciences actually follow the ‘emancipatory interest’ 
of Habermas, which he saw as a leading interest in radical social sciences (Marx, 
Freud). The traditional concept of wisdom in Greek and Chinese philosophy was 
basically a knowledge of fundamental cosmic values and how they directed human 
knowledge and actions. It is now again time to make explicit in the philosophy of 
science the core values leading scientific enterprise. Environmental sciences should 
therefore consult environmental philosophy in order to make their ontological 
and value-theoretical standpoint clear. Environmental sciences still often lean 
simply on traditional anthropocentric values, and this is very problematic, not 
only for science but also for environmental ethics and politics.
For the philosophy of education, von Wright’s distinction between the 
rational and the reasonable is very important. Pure rationality in education 
can lead to the social-technological conception of education as a pure means 
for economic and administrative goals, nowadays especially for international 
economic competition. Education is not seen as important per se for full human 
5 I have analysed von Wright as an environmental thinker more broadly in Väyrynen (2017).
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development relatively independent from practical economic and real political 
goals. An extreme consequence of this social-technological rationality would be 
a kind of a la carte education (as Lyotard, 1984 has expressed it), supporting the 
contingent needs of the economy. In this view, humans are only flexible material 
for economic purposes without any intrinsic value.
A wise education, on the contrary, would be critical of immediate economic 
or political trends because they can lead to negative developments, such as the 
emergence of the Nazi regime in the 1930s, or support the currently deepening 
environmental crisis. A wise education should have a long enough historical 
perspective to recognise dangerous political trends. This has been stressed both in 
conservative and radical political thinking (in Burke and Marx, to give a classical 
example): a longer historical perspective can show how complex a set of entities 
a wise politics – and as a part of it, education – must take into account. Utopian 
alternatives – such as escaping from environmental problems to other planets 
– are always too simple and have therefore many unforeseen side effects. Also 
simple pedagogical solutions, such as the hype of information technology, share 
the same problem. Children, as part of the changing society and environment, 
are an extremely complex phenomenon: how do we keep the rich possibilities of 
their bio-psychological and intellectual-emotional development on solid ground 
through the antithetic pressures of the coming decades? A wise pedagogy does not 
necessarily have any better answers to these future challenges, but it attempts at 
least to recognise the central problems involved in this without overly simple or 
utopian answers.
Dialectical thinking: Basic structures
The Hegelian theory of education and Bildung is based on his dialectics. Like 
all processes of reality, education and Bildung are antagonistic. They must 
find a balance between antagonistic tendencies relevant to education, such as 
individuality–collectivity, autonomy–heteronomy, egoism–altruism, formal–
material, etc. In addition, our relationship with nature is antithetic in the sense of 
dialectical thinking: we try to understand and control an entity that is radically 
different from our immediate human world. Alternatively, we are ‘cultural 
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animals’ – animals as a part of nature. We can experience nature directly through 
our body, emotions and living experiences (elämys, Erlebnis), and through concepts 
and categories, which express natural properties, structures and processes. We 
also have important valuative connections to nature. We are both identical to and 
different from it.
Dialectical logic has developed a system of categories that express complex and 
dynamic interconnections between our thinking and ontological realities. Hegel’s 
Wissenschaft der Logik (Science of Logic) in particular exemplifies the extremely 
complex structures involved. It is very difficult to comprehend as a whole.6 
However, luckily the organising principle is quite simple and fundamental to all 
critical thinking and its problems. This famous structure is the Hegelian triad, 
or thesis–antithesis–synthesis. It is useful to briefly describe its fundamental idea.
The first step, thesis, leans on our immediate thinking: some concept as such 
is the dominant perspective on reality. This can be a position in our ordinary 
thinking, a common sense view of something, as a scientific, paradigmatic position 
in some field of research. This position is typical for every reductionistic position 
in science. However, in connection to the objective world, this thesis turns out 
to be problematic; it leaves residues (see Lefebvre, 2016, pp. 11–12, 299–303, 
passim.), which cannot be properly explained by the original thesis. We must 
therefore try to formulate an antithesis, which could better explain these residues. 
Through this, we must take a different or even a contradictory perspective. This 
is often logically implicit in the original thesis: for example, the simple idea that 
something ‘is’, is originally connected to its contradictory thought that something 
‘is not’.7 It is important to note that not all antitheses develop in this formal 
way. The material aspects of reality often also demand a dialectical analysis. For 
example, concrete social antagonisms must be expressed in thinking through 
contradictory concepts. Master–slave dialectics, which is analysed in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), is the most famous example. For our topic, the 
6 It is therefore understandable that the recently extensive analytical metaphysics and 
ontology has not taken the challenge of this work seriously. Theoretically, this new trend of 
analytical philosophy has returned to pre-Kantian metaphysics.
7 Plato explained the birth of dialectics in this way. See my article concerning the 
interconnections between Plato’s and Hegel’s dialectics, Väyrynen 2017(a). In Hegel’s Science 
of logic, the famous first triad (being – nothingness – becoming) analyses these elementary 
concepts more deeply.
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great, basic antagonism of spirit–nature (Geist – Natur) is especially important. 
This antagonism is fundamental to Hegel’s whole philosophical system, expressed 
in his Encyclopaedias of Philosophical Sciences (1817).
The relation of thesis and antithesis is typical for all critical thinking: it is 
therefore pedagogically important. However, there is also a danger of relativism 
and scepticism, or ‘negative dialectics’, to use Hegel’s expression. The third aspect 
of the dialectical triad, synthesis, should lead to a higher, positive result in this 
respect – ‘positive dialectics’, or speculation. But what is synthesis? This may be 
the most difficult aspect to comprehend in Hegel’s dialectics. I briefly present here 
my own view of this crucial concept. 
First, synthesis is not a formal combination of thesis and antithesis; it is not 
simply a more general concept in which thesis and antithesis are included as parts. 
It rather opens up a wider ontological perspective for antithetic concepts. For 
example ‘becoming’ (Werden) is an ontological perspective through which ‘being’ 
(something is; Sein) and non-being (something is not; Nichts) can be understood as 
more limited positions to the reality as a whole, as relative aspects of a higher truth 
explicated in ‘becoming’. ‘Becoming’ as a synthesis makes it possible to understand 
on one hand the limits and on the other hand the relative merits of ‘being’ and 
‘not-being’. This is the idea of ‘sublating’ (Aufhebung) the contradictory concepts: 
through this ‘sublating’ act, they partly remain relevant aspects or moments in the 
higher concept.8 Becoming, for its part, needs something that ‘is’ and becomes 
something else – not-being. The parts of the triad are necessarily connected.
In terms of ontology, one could say that Hegel’s triads express central 
modal structures of a stratified reality. In the modal theory of Hegel, a central 
modal concept is actual reality (Wirklichkeit). Its essence is activity, Wirken, 
and it is therefore understandable that Hegel criticises formal possibilities and 
contrafactual thinking about emptiness. According to him, it is more important to 
stress strata-specific real possibilities in modal thinking. For pedagogy, this means 
that, instead of utopic solutions, we must think about what the central historical 
possibilities to act in the near future are. This does not support deterministic talk 
8 We could generally say, that through the process of Aufhebung the perspectives opened 
up by thesis and antithesis remain as relevant parts in a more holistic concept expressed by 
synthesis. On the level of synthesis, we know better their limits and relative truths. They no 
longer produce ‘residues’ as reductionistic concepts do (as Lefebvre 2016 – see above – noted).
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common in everyday politics, visions of some ‘only one alternative’. By adopting 
a long historical perspective, as Hegel always did, we can formulate surprising 
alternatives based on long historical experience. For example, a sustainable way 
of living is possible without consuming as much as we do. Historical experience 
can inform us that it is a real possibility to live with much less consumption than 
we are used to do. Dialectical forms of thinking, in this case for example Hegel’s 
dialectics of master–slave, can open up such perspectives: our position as masters 
of nature is not based on sustainable productivity, as in principle the position of 
the slave should be in Hegel’s example.
As you can see, I represent a realistic metaphysical interpretation of the 
dialectical categories. According to this interpretation, Hegel’s Science of Logic is 
a system of ontological categories which express his stratified ontological position. 
This kind of interpretation of Hegel’s dialectics is to my mind fundamental to our 
topic: how to understand environmental wisdom as a thinking of real possibilities 
and to develop a pedagogical theory which would best suit its demands. But has 
Hegel anything to offer for environmental wisdom? Is his philosophy of spirit not 
too idealistic and anthropocentric for this purpose? The crucial question is, what 
kind of dialectical relationship is there between spirit and nature? In what sense 
are nature and spirit ‘sublated’ in a higher totality? Moreover, could this dialectical 
totality be a serious candidate for ecological wisdom? Finally, what does this 
mean to the Hegelian concept of Bildung: how does the dialectics of spirit and 
nature contribute to environmentally wise pedagogy? Bildung is a concept that 
reflects human history: how should we connect it to historicity in nature? Should 
environmental education be based on this comprehensive consciousness of human 
historicity as a part of natural history, especially its slow processes?
Towards a concrete identity with nature?
Hegel clearly criticises the romantic view of man’s relationship with nature, in 
which the immediate identity and harmony with nature is idealised. In his 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion), he analyses the romantic pantheism as a form of ‘natural religion’ 
(Naturreligion). He writes: 
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The unity of man with nature is a favourite and pleasant-sounding expression … 
But his true nature is freedom, free spirituality … and as thus fixed this unity is 
no longer a natural, immediate unity. Plants are in this condition of unbroken 
unity. The spiritual, on the contrary … has to work its way through its infinite 
dualism or division, and to win the state of accomplished reconciliation 
(Versöhnung) by wrestling for it; it is not an original reconciliation.9 
This view of immediate identity historically has many forms: Hegel mentions, 
for example, the idea of innocent children and aboriginal people, the doctrine 
of the signatura rerum in the philosophy of the Middle Ages and the instinctive 
actions of animals (Väyrynen, 2010, p. 360). The concept of immediate identity is 
still today a popular position in environmental thinking. Modern man could try 
to overcome his alienation from nature through the restoration of this original 
identity, for example in adopting the ecologically wise conceptions, values 
and practices of aboriginal people or oriental wisdom. This kind of ecological 
primitivism also supposes an original ecological wisdom of these people, but this 
supposition lacks any empirical evidence.10
Hegel considers this romantic view problematic in two respects: it is (a) first 
empirically not true: aboriginal people are seldom innocent, and children are often 
egoistic and bad. (b) Secondly, the more important point is that this innocence is 
not a real position of man. His ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is higher than the innocence 
of children. It is based on his self-conscious will. Man must work on his moral 
education and Bildung through alienation from nature, sketch his essence freely 
and take as an autonomous subject the moral responsibility. According to Hegel, 
nature is not morally good; it is on the contrary a brutal struggle for survival. 
Human history, insofar as it is ‘natural history’ (Naturgeschichte des Menschen), is 
as amoral as the natural struggle for survival. Ethical life can be established only 
through hard work for the moral good. Nature as such gives no clear directions 
for this moral work (Väyrynen, 2010, pp. 361–362). Also, our own individual 
goodwill (Moralität) is, according to Hegel, not enough: we must develop such 
institutional practices (Sittlichkeit) that make a concrete realisation of our ethical 
goals possible (Väyrynen, 2016). This is extremely important in environmental 
9 I have partly used the English translation of his lectures. Hegel, 1974, p. 279.
10 On the critics of environmental primitivism see Korteniemi, 2009.
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ethics because many of our individual choices, for example as ‘green consumers’, 
only help to maintain ecologically harmful industries. 
Is the idea of identity totally wrong? Is there in Hegel no continuity from 
nature to the ethical life and spirituality of man? This question is addressed at the 
end of his Philosophy of Nature. As we saw, nature as such is amoral or even bad 
and cannot therefore give any ethical guidelines. We would even destroy nature 
if we acted ‘according to nature’ in this respect. Despite this, there is one aspect 
in which man and nature are in continuum with each other and which also has 
moral significance. This aspect of nature is its creative force, or in the language of 
German Idealism, the ‘inner teleology’ of nature.11 For Hegel, this makes a higher, 
dialectical identity with nature possible.
Reconciliation with nature is a dialectical process like the general process of 
Bildung: it has both harmonic and hostile phases/aspects because as tool-using 
animals we must control and use nature in the work process. However, we cannot 
control it totally – in the last analysis, nature is always stronger than man. Hegel 
therefore criticises the position of ‘outer teleology’ (or ‘limited teleology’) and its 
ways of interacting with nature.
In Kritik der Urteilskraft (The Critique of Judgement), Kant made a distinction 
between outer and inner teleology (äussere vs. innere Zweckmässigkeit). His famous 
example concerning the difference was natural beauty and its imitation through 
human art. Authentic natural beauty, for example birdsong, expresses the inner 
teleology of nature; it is a free act of the bird itself. It expresses the authentic value 
of nature, which we observe as beauty (Kant, 1966). In German Romanticism and 
German Idealism, this view was adopted from the pantheism of Spinoza, whose 
idea of creative nature (natura naturans) was also important for Hegel. For him, 
inner teleology expresses the real essence of life and also affects positive human 
freedom because, as living creatures, we must ultimately learn to reconcile with 
our own nature as well as ‘outer’ nature.
Hegel describes ‘outer’ or ‘limited’ teleology as a goal-oriented exploitation of 
nature which does not respect its inner goals and its own intrinsic values. Outer 
11 I have analysed the history of this idea from Eastern and early Greek philosophy until 
Romanticism in my history of environmental philosophy (Väyrynen, 2006) and I summarised 
the central thesis in contrast to the recent constructivist approach of environmental research 
in an article (Väyrynen, 2017a).
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teleology has an empirical (sinnliches) relationship with nature, in which nature is 
objectified – it is only lifeless material for our immediate needs. Hegel writes: ‘Our 
practical relationship with nature is dominated through our egoistic needs; our 
needs strive to use nature for our benefit, to polish, to break up; shortly, to destroy 
it’.12 We break nature into useful parts and are not concerned what nature is as a 
whole. Only singular products of nature and their singular aspects are important 
to us. Hegel dooms this kind of practice with the words of Sophocles: ‘Nothing is 
more monstrous than man … unexperienced. He does not reach his goals’.13 
This immediate practical relationship with nature is not the deepest possibility 
to interact with nature. As Hegel stressed, it is empirical, shallow and responds 
only to our egoistic, immediate needs. We actually act at this level like lower 
animals. What would be a higher, properly human alternative? As cultivated 
humans, we are not bound to this immediate practical action, which actually 
represents only the ‘first nature’, a level at which we act as other animals in an 
evolutionary struggle for survival. As cultural beings, in the moral, aesthetical and 
intellectual realm of ‘second nature’, we are not bound to this struggle. 
According to Hegel, we must ask what nature ‘in general’ (Allgemeinheit) is. 
Our practical dominance over nature always remains shallow; it cannot reach 
‘nature as such’, its generality.14 This deeper view of the essence of nature can be 
reached at the level of dialectical reason, in the position of the ‘concept’ (Begriff ). 
At this level, nature is not an empirical, shallow object of practical exploitation 
but a living, active and autonomous entity. At this level, it is continuous with 
human autonomy and freedom. Hegel writes ‘the real teleological view – and this 
is the highest – is based on the understanding that nature is free in its original 
livingness’.15 
What does this mean for our practical relationship with nature? This question 
is analysed at the end of Philosophy of Nature, in which the reconciliation 
12 ‘Das praktische Verhalten zur Natur ist durch die Begierde, welche selbstsüchtig ist, 
überhaupt bestimmt; das Bedürfnis geht darauf, die Natur zu unserem Nutzen zu verwenden, 
sie abzureiben, aufzureiben, kurz, sie zu vernichten.’ Werke, 9, 13.
13 ‘Nichts ist ungeheurer als der Mensch … Unbewandert. Zu nichts kommt er.’ Werke, 9, 13
14 Werke, 9, 14.
15 ‘die wahre teleologische Betrachtung – und diese ist die höchste – besteht also darin, die 
Natur als frei in ihrer eigentümlichen Lebendigkeit zu betrachten.’ Werke, 9, 14.
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(Versöhnung) of the spirit and nature is briefly described. Nature is not alien to the 
spirit; it is rather its necessary moment. The inner teleology of nature represents in 
nature the moment of spirit, its seed, which develops through different forms of 
activity and creativity in nature. At the elementary level, the freedom of the spirit 
is based on this process. The real freedom of the spirit is therefore not an absolute 
negation of nature in its absolute ‘otherness’ but rather a reconciliation with it. This 
reconciliation, and the ‘true freedom’ of the spirit, is therefore a learning process 
in which the spirit ‘abandons its special way of thinking and understanding’. 
Through this, nature becomes ‘a mirror of ourselves … a free reflex of the spirit’.16 
I would summarise that the inner teleology of nature is a parallel characteristic 
of our real freedom. Our positive freedom presupposes the full development of 
this freedom in nature. This connection makes it possible to valuate and respect 
living nature in its autonomous development, for example through the protection 
of biodiversity.
As we saw above, outer teleology, its egoistic actions and negative freedom in 
dominating nature is clearly doomed by Hegel. Hegel is not an ethical relativist, 
although he stresses our complex and partly antagonistic relationship with nature. 
We must dominate some aspects of it, insofar as it is necessary for survival, but as 
cultural beings, we must strive for this respectfully, in a learning and reconciling 
attitude and action towards nature. Nature is an essential resource of our own 
Bildung on all levels – including also its highest, such as artistic and philosophical 
forms. 
A wise, reason-based action must preserve the forms of inner teleology in 
nature, not only for the sake of nature itself but also for the sake of humanity as 
part of nature: as a valuable resource of our own health, wellbeing, social identities 
and artistic, technological and scientific inspiration. Ars imitatur naturam – this is 
not only true concerning artistic creativity but also culture as a whole. Nature is a 
cultural resource – this is a direct application of Hegel’s view of the reconciliation 
of nature and spirit. Nature is not only a material resource, as in outer teleology. 
Biodiversity and other ecological values should be respected due to cultural 
reasons. Even in the field of technology, nature is providing new inspiration for 
innovations all the time, such as scientists attempting to research how to imitate 
16  (der Geist) ‘seine besondere Denk- und Anschauungsweise abtut.’ Die Natur wird ein 
‘Spiegel unserer selbst … ein freier Reflex des Geistes.’ Werke, 9, 538–539.
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the strength of a spider’s web. In this respect, the discussion about the priority of 
biocentrism or anthropocentrism is a trail with a dead end – the more important 
problem is the reconciliation of nature and culture, as ‘weak’ anthropocentrism 
and biocentrism are trying to establish.
Bildung and historical consciousness – A wise 
starting point for environmental education?
Natural processes are slow. That is one ‘radically other’ aspect in nature that is 
particularly difficult to understand today. Also in environmental thinking, 
the transformation from traditional conservationism to a more relativistic 
environmentalism is leading to a historical standpoint: there is not even a 
relatively stable nature that we should protect and everything is affected by 
human intervention. At the same time, we do not question the opposite trend 
of current history, which seems to favour rapid changes and the readiness to 
accept everything new. Global economic competition also favours short-term 
innovations in science, technology and economic production.
On an ideological level, higher goals of human wellbeing and environmental 
sustainability are almost universally accepted. However, this is illusionary: the 
immanent goal is to increase economic surplus and guarantee steady economic 
growth. Striving for a ‘greener’ economy and politics do not succeed because the 
fundamental goal is still economic growth. Cosmetic changes such as electronic 
cars work only as a moral alibi for continuing business as usual. 
Human and environmental wellbeing are interpreted accordingly in 
dynamic and anti-essential terms. Interpreted as such, especially in postmodern 
constructivism, they cannot form any coherent standpoint for critical opposition. 
Alternatively, we cannot return to the linear philosophy of a history of ‘great 
narratives’. However, this does not mean that human and environmental history 
have no relative stability. We know some simple and decisive things concerning 
human and environmental wellbeing. We cannot stand a climate which is very 
polluted or has longer periods over +50 °C. The atmosphere must have a certain 
percentage of oxygen so that we can survive. We must have enough fruitful soil 
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and clean drinking water to nourish the entire human population. Such basic 
ramifications are historically very stable. In addition, as we now know, they are 
vulnerable and scarce resources already in many parts of the Earth. Environmental 
history teaches us this simple lesson; it is a kind of metanarrative17 of human 
history that cannot be eliminated.
For environmental education and Bildung it is also important to stress that it 
is not only the past – as environmental history shows – that is the problem here 
but also the possible future. The future is not a totally open field of possibilities, 
but in many ways, it is determined by the past and present. That is especially 
accentuated today because the effects of our actions reach not only in space but 
also in time far longer than before: every piece of plastic that we throw in ocean 
can have serious effects on ecosystems after hundreds of years. As Hans Jonas has 
shown, our technological society challenges traditional ethics in this respect: ‘the 
sheer magnitude and often also the irreversibility of the long-term effects of our 
actions make the questions of responsibility central for ethics in corresponding 
horizons of time and space’ (Jonas, 1984, pp. 8–9). It is increasingly difficult to 
foresee the effects of our actions in time and space as well in social and ecological 
contexts: we need therefore to take the ‘precautionary principle’ as a starting point 
for new ethics.
What does this mean for environmental education? First, it stresses the 
meaning of a long historical perspective, including environmental history, social 
and economic history and the history of ideas. The pedagogical tradition of 
Bildung has this long-term perspective: the whole process of human cultivation 
and its dialectical structure is a background condition for all historically conscious 
education. It is sad that not even professional historians do not always understand 
this. Most historians are increasingly concentrating on current history because 
it is easy to research: for example, Antiquity and the Middle Ages are not such 
popular topics because they demand extensive language skills. On the other hand, 
17 With my term ‘metanarrative’ I slightly ironise narrativistic talk here – avoiding the 
extinction of human species has not yet been any narrative, but can become in future a great 
narrative of our time … if we do success to stay alive.
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environmental history is still a marginal area in traditional historiography – and 
it is also difficult because of its methodological and cross-disciplinary problems.18
Environmental history has also been a peripheral topic in environmental 
education. Environmental education stresses the meaning of empirical 
knowledge, especially living experiences in nature (Matthies, 2004). However, 
the longue duree of natural processes and our interactions with them are difficult 
to grasp in the immediate experience: they rather demand combined theoretical 
and historical knowledge about climate change, demographical processes and 
ecological dynamics – and very often about their complex interactions. A historical 
perspective should become part of teaching in the natural sciences – the old field of 
natural history has indeed been revived in environmental sciences, from geology 
to ecology. Natural history and environmental history19 actually cooperate today 
because the co-evolution of human society/culture and nature/environment 
is presently fundamental for human ontology and an environmentally aware 
philosophical anthropology. This many-sided, stratified, deeply historical view is 
pedagogically fundamental in changing the current hectic, short-term visions that 
are so popular in neoliberal economics and politics. 
The key issue is that historical consciousness opens up a deeper understanding 
of our current situation. We must learn to see how our present time is structured 
through overlapping histories: we still partly behave like hunter-gatherers; we 
use the products of agriculture extensively, and we use land extensively through 
that. We still act in the way Christianity has taught us: we think we are higher 
than animals and nature, with a basic right to control and use them as we see fit, 
and that we should ‘propagate and fill the earth’. These deep structures of our 
18 I have conducted with the Finnish environmental historian Esa Ruuskanen a basic 
mapping of the short history of this discipline from the 1970s until the present day, and I 
have also analysed some of its theoretical problems as a multidisciplinary field of research 
(Ruuskanen & Väyrynen 2017).
19 The currently fashionable concept of the Anthropocene is too general for this purpose: 
as a geological period, it is not historically sensitive enough. In environmental history, 
periodisation must be based on multiple factors, from ideological (Christianity, liberalism, 
etc.) and economic transitions (birth of agriculture, industrialisation, use of fossil fuels, etc.) to 
climate periods (Medieval Warm Period, etc.) and ecological transformations (periods of mass 
extinction, extensive erosion and desertification, etc.). Just one way of periodicalising history 
(like the concept of the Anthropocene does) is not sufficient, because of many overlapping 
changes at different levels of reality.
Kari Väyrynen
212
present-day lives can only be effectively criticised after having gained an extensive 
understanding of human history and its interaction with the natural environment.
Leaning on this ontological fundament, we should re-evaluate the traditional 
idea of slow and many-sided human development (as Rousseau stressed) through 
the current perspective of co-evolution and formulate pedagogical practices which 
can, in this respect, produce sustainable results. Humans who take better care of 
their bio-psychological wealth tend to have sympathy for the wellbeing of other 
people and responsibility for the slow processes of nature. We must learn to listen 
to our bodily interaction with the environment, our emotions – especially moral 
ones, such as sympathy for other species (not only animals but also plants), and 
our aesthetical admiration of beautiful and sublime nature. Through historical 
consciousness, we can deepen these ontological fundaments to a concrete critique 
of our present-day limitations to realise these potentialities.
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